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ABSTRACT
 The Supreme Court significantly affected the dynamics of patent litigation, holding 
that patent claim interpretation was not always reviewed de novo1 and that good faith 
belief that a patent was invalid was not a defense to infringement.2 The Federal Circuit 
potentially changed the approach to patent claim interpretation, holding that claims 
could be interpreted in light of the written description of the invention, even where the 
claim was not ambiguous. The Federal Circuit also addressed inducement of patent 
infringement, holding that it was not inducement to suggest consulting a physician who 
would likely prescribe an infringing treatment.3 The Federal Circuit also held that two 
parties acting in concert could infringe a patent, replacing its rejected doctrine of divided 
infringement.4 Trademark saw rejection of trade dress protection for cell phone design5
and conflicting opinions on whether disparaging trademarks are registrable.6 Copyright 
cases show that fair use authorized the Google Book project7 and also protected against 
attempts to use copyright to censor critics.8 Courts addressed some classics of copyright 
courses, including the copyrightability of maps,9 recipes,10 and “Happy Birthday to 
You.”11 Trade secret cases emphasized the fundamental requirements, rejecting attempts 
to give trade secret protection where parties had failed to take the necessary reasonable 
security measures.12
1 Teva Pharms. USA, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 831 (2015). 
2 Commil USA, LLC v. Cisco Sys., 135 S. Ct. 1920 (2015). 
3 Takeda Pharms. U.S.A., Inc. v. West-Ward Pharm. Corp., 785 F.3d 625(Fed. Cir. 2015). 
4 Akamai Techs., Inc. v. Limelight Networks, Inc., 797 F.3d 1020 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (en banc). 
5 Apple v. Samsung Elecs. Co., 2015 U.S. App. LEXIS 8096 (Fed. Cir. May 18, 2015). 
6 Pro-Football, Inc. v. Blackhorse , 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 89932 (E.D. Va. July 8, 2015); In re Tam 
785 F.3d 567 (Fed. Cir. 2015). 
7 Authors Guild v. Google, Inc., 804 F.3d 202 (2d Cir. N.Y. 2015). 
8 City of Inglewood v. Teixeira, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 143380 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 8, 2015). 
9 PhantomALERT, Inc. v. Google Inc., 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 167754 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 14, 2015). 
10 Tomaydo-Tomahhdo, LLC v. Vozary, 2015 U.S. App. LEXIS 18384 (6th Cir. 2015). 
11 Marya v. Warner/Chappell Music, Inc., 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 129575 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 22, 2015). 
12 See, e.g., Events Media Network, Inc. v. Weather Channel Interactive, Inc., 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
12497 (D.N.J. Feb. 3, 2015). 
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I. PATENT
A. Teva Pharm. USA, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc.13
¶1  The key issue in many patent cases is interpretation of the relevant patent claim. A 
broad or narrow reading of the claim may control whether the patent is valid and whether 
there has been infringement. The Supreme Court, in Teva Pharm. USA, Inc. v. Sandoz, 
Inc, overruled long-standing Federal Circuit precedent and held that patent claim 
interpretation is a legal question that may depend on subsidiary factual determinations, so 
appellate review is a hybrid: de novo for the questions of law, clear error for the factual 
determinations.14 The issue in the case was the meaning of the term “molecular weight” 
as used in the claim allegedly infringed.15 The trial court interpreted the claim as referring 
to molecular weight, finding one expert witness more convincing than another. The 
appellate court reversed, holding the term to be indefinite.16 The Supreme Court reversed, 
13 135 S. Ct. 831, 841 (2015). 
14 Id. at 841 (“Accordingly, the question we have answered here concerns review of the district court’s 
resolution of a subsidiary factual dispute that helps that court determine the proper interpretation of the 
written patent claim. The district judge, after deciding the factual dispute, will then interpret the patent 
claim in light of the facts as he has found them. This ultimate interpretation is a legal conclusion. The 
appellate court can still review the district court’s ultimate construction of the claim de novo. But, to 
overturn the judge’s resolution of an underlying factual dispute, the Court of Appeals must find that the 
judge, in respect to those factual findings, has made a clear error.”). 
15 Id. at 836. 
16 Id.
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holding not that the appellate court had misinterpreted the claim, but rather that the 
Federal Circuit practice gave too little deference to trial courts. 
The district judge, after deciding the factual dispute, will then interpret the 
patent claim in light of the facts as he has found them. This ultimate 
interpretation is a legal conclusion. The appellate court can still review the 
district court’s ultimate construction of the claim de novo. But, to overturn 
the judge’s resolution of an underlying factual dispute, the Court of 
Appeals must find that the judge, in respect to those factual findings, has 
made a clear error.17
¶2 Teva may add reduce uncertainty to licensing practice, to the extent it makes 
litigation more certain.  When claim construction is reviewed completely de novo, then 
the meaning of a patent claim remains unsettled until the appellate court has interpreted 
the claim. To the extent claim interpretation rests on factual determinations, then the trial 
court’s reading is more likely to be the final reading. Because every claim is different 
(every patent must be different, because only new inventions are patentable), this increase 
in certainty may facilitate licensing, at the margin. 
B. Fenner Invs., Ltd. v. Cellco P’ship18
¶3  In Fenner, the Federal Circuit looked to the written description portion of the 
patent in interpreting patent claims, even where there was no ambiguity in the claim itself 
and there was no definition in the written description.19 The court held that reference to 
the written description is proper to provide context to terms in claims, as opposed to 
relying simply on their “literal” meaning.20 That approach is starkly at odds with the 
traditional position of the Federal Circuit, under which unambiguous claims speak for 
themselves, without need for interpretive guidance from the written description. If the 
court continues to apply this approach, the impact on patent litigation and practice could 
take different directions. It might clarify matters, on the grounds that patent claims will 
be read more reliably, in a way that makes sense in terms of the entire patent. Or it might 
introduce uncertainty, because apparently clear claims will become open to 
reinterpretation based on argument drawn from anywhere in the entire patent. In addition, 
the interplay with Teva could mean that apparently clear claims might be reinterpreted 
based on factual determinations necessary to interpret other parts of the patent, which in 
term give meaning to the patent claims. So Fenner may represent an attempt to make 
patent claim interpretation more reliable, at the cost of introducing uncertainty into patent 
practice, which in turn may complicate licensing of some patents and likewise complicate 
patent disputes. 
17 Id. at 841 (citing FED. R. CIV. P. 52(a)(6)). 
18 778 F.3d 1320, 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2015). 
19 See, e.g., id. at 1323 (holding “[t]he foundation of judicial claim construction is the ‘written 
description’ in the specification,” and interpreting claim in light of written description, including drawings). 
20 Id.
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C. Commil USA, LLC v. Cisco Sys.21
Takeda Pharm. U.S.A., Inc. v. West-Ward Pharm. Corp.22
¶4  A party seeking to license a patent may do so by enforcement, identifying potential 
infringers and demanding a license. Potential infringers may include those actual 
infringing and secondary infringers, such as someone inducing infringement of the 
patent. Such secondary liability expands the scope of the patent’s power and the set of 
potential licensees. Patent infringement may be strict liability, in a sense. Someone that 
makes or uses the invention infringes, even if they do not know the invention is patented. 
But inducement liability is not strict liability. The Supreme Court held that there is no 
liability for inducement if the actor did not know of the relevant patent.23 In 2015, 
Commil addressed the intermediate question: is there liability for inducement of 
infringement, where the inducer knows of the patent but believes the patent is invalid? 
The Court held that a good faith belief that a patent is invalid is not a defense to a claim 
of inducement to infringe the patent.24
¶5  The boundaries of inducement were tested in Takeda, which held that a generic 
pharmaceutical maker was not liable for inducement of infringement. Knowledge of the 
relevant patent was not the issue, rather the question was the link between the defendant’s 
behavior and subsequent infringement. Defendant’s advertising advised patients to 
consult a physician if the patient experienced “gout flares.”25 The physician might then 
prescribe an off-label use of the defendant’s pharmaceutical, which would infringe 
method claims of the relevant patent. Such implicit encouragement fell short of 
inducement: “Speculation or even proof that some, or even many, doctors would 
prescribe Mitigare for acute flares is hardly evidence of inevitability. This evidence does 
not show anything more than that there may be some infringing uses of Mitigare.” 26
D. Akamai Techs., Inc. v. Limelight Networks, Inc.27
¶6  Akamai also involves the practical question of, how large is the set of potential 
patent infringers (and, indirectly, potential licensees). In 2014, the Supreme Court, in 
Limelight Networks, Inc. v. Akamai Techs., Inc.,28  rejected the theory of “divided 
infringement,” under which there could be liability for inducement of patent infringement 
by causing two people to take steps that, added together, would infringe a method patent, 
even if neither performed all the steps that would infringe.  The Supreme Court in 
Akamai held there could be no secondary infringement by inducement, unless it resulted 
in at least one direct infringer.  But the Court left open the possibility that there could be 
21 135 S. Ct. 1920 (2015). 
22 785 F.3d 625 (Fed. Cir. 2015). 
23 Global-Tech Appliances, Inc. v. SEB S.A., 131 S. Ct. 2060 (2011). See Stephen McJohn, Top Tens 
in 2011: Patent and Trademark Cases, 10 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 313, 317 (2012). 
24 Commil USA, LLC v. Cisco Sys., 135 S. Ct. 1920 (2015). 
25 Id. at 630. 
26 Id. at 633. 
27 797 F.3d 1020, 1023 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (en banc).
28 134 S. Ct. 2111 (2014); see McJohn, Top Tens in 2014: Patent, Trademark, Copyright and Trade 
Secret Cases, 13 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP., 317, 325 (2015). 
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infringement under such facts, if the parties were to be working together and so to jointly 
infringe. On remand, the Federal Circuit followed that broad hint and abandoned its prior 
requirement that joint infringement requires agency or contract, not simply two parties 
working together. “We conclude, on the facts of this case, that liability under § 271(a) 
can also be found when an alleged infringer conditions participation in an activity or 
receipt of a benefit upon performance of a step or steps of a patented method and 
establishes the manner or timing of that performance. . . . Alternatively, where two or 
more actors form a joint enterprise, all can be charged with the acts of the other, 
rendering each liable for the steps performed by the other as if each is a single actor.”29
Akamai affects both patent drafting and enforcement. Patent claims need not be drafted 
so narrowly that they cover only the actions of a single person. Multiple people acting 
together may infringe. By the same token, a license may be necessary to avoid 
infringement, even for an actor performing only some of the steps of a patented method. 
E. Kimble v. Marvel Entm’t30
¶7  Kimble declined to overturn a much-criticized but easily avoided restriction on 
patent licensing. In 1964, Brulotte v. Thys Co.31 held that a patent holder cannot charge 
29  Akamai Techs., Inc. v. Limelight Networks, Inc., 797 F.3d 1020, 1023 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (en banc).
30 135 S.Ct. 2401 (2015). 
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royalties for the use of the invention after the patent expired. The rule has long been 
criticized, on the theory that an agreement during the patent term for royalties payable 
after the term does not leverage, the patent beyond its term, rather gets a promise payable 
in the future. But the Kimble court in 2015 affirmed the 1964 holding of Brulotte that 
license terms that go beyond the term of the relevant intellectual property may be 
unenforceable, even without a showing that they have anti-competitive effect.32 Kimble
recognized the widespread criticism of Brulotte but held that considerations of stare 
decisis were stronger. The rule was not shown to be so harmful that it was necessary to 
overrule it. Congress had let the decision stand for decades. There was no actual evidence 
(as opposed to economic theorizing) to show that it had a negative impact on innovation, 
for parties could still do transactions with little obstruction: 
Yet parties can often find ways around Brulotte, enabling them to achieve 
those same ends. To start, Brulotte allows a licensee to defer payments for 
pre-expiration use of a patent into the post-expiration period; all the 
decision bars are royalties for using an invention after it has moved into 
the public domain. A licensee could agree, for example, to pay the licensor 
a sum equal to 10% of sales during the 20-year patent term, but to 
amortize that amount over 40 years. That arrangement would at least bring 
down early outlays, even if it would not do everything the parties might 
want to allocate risk over a long timeframe. And parties have still more 
options when a licensing agreement covers either multiple patents or 
additional non-patent rights. Under Brulotte, royalties may run until the 
latest-running patent covered in the parties' agreement expires. Too, post-
expiration royalties are allowable so long as tied to a non-patent right—
even when closely related to a patent. That means, for example, that a 
license involving both a patent and a trade secret can set a 5% royalty 
during the patent period (as compensation for the two combined) and a 4% 
royalty afterward (as payment for the trade secret alone). Finally and most 
broadly, Brulotte poses no bar to business arrangements other than 
royalties—all kinds of joint ventures, for example—that enable parties to 
share the risks and rewards of commercializing an invention.33
¶8 The Brulotte rule still stands. But, important for practitioners, the Court made clear 
that Brulotte is little more than a formality. As long as parties to a licensing transaction 
are aware of the rule, they can structure their transaction to implement their deal, with 
compliance with Brulotte presenting only drafting issues. So Brulotte is mainly a trap for 
the unwary. 
31 379 U.S. 29, 85 S. Ct. 176, 13 L. Ed. 2d 99 (1964). 
32 Kimble v. Marvel Entm’t, 135 S. Ct. 2401 (2015). 
33 Id. at 2408 (citations omitted). 
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F. Aria Diagnostics, Inc. v. Sequenom, Inc.34
¶9 In 2014, in Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank Int’l,35 the Supreme Court set out a 
stricter test for patentable subject matter. 36 The Alice court indicated that computer-
related claims would have to be closely tied to a specific application to be patentable: 
“The method claims do not, for example, purport to improve the functioning of the 
computer itself. Nor do they effect an improvement in any other technology or technical 
field.”37 In the wake of Alice, many computer-related patents have been held invalid as 
claiming an unpatentable abstract idea, as opposed to a patentable application. Retaining 
information in the navigation of online forms was held an abstract idea,38 as was using 
software to make financial management decisions (such as budgeting).39 Such decisions 
have broad potential effect in software licensing, making it much more difficult for the 
holder of software patent with broad claims to be able to secure licenses from those 
practicing technology that fall within those broad claims. 
¶10  Sequenom shows how Alice goes beyond computer claims to areas such as biotech. 
The effect with respect to some biotech patents may be quite different than in software. 
The principal issue with software is often whether the patent broadly claims an abstract 
idea, as opposed to narrowly claiming a specific application of an idea.40 That issue may 
certainly arise in biotech, especially because in the age of genetics, much of biotech 
depends on computing. But Sequenom shows the application of a different exception to 
patentability (the nonpatentability of natural phenomena) which may bar patents even for 
quite specific innovations. Sequenom’s patent covered a significant development in fetal 
testing:
In 1996, Drs. Dennis Lo and James Wainscoat discovered cell-free fetal 
DNA (“cffDNA”) in maternal plasma and serum, the portion of maternal 
blood samples that other researchers had previously discarded as medical 
waste. cffDNA is non-cellular fetal DNA that circulates freely in the blood 
stream of a pregnant woman. Applying a combination of known 
laboratory techniques to their discovery, Drs. Lo and Wainscoat 
implemented a method for detecting the small fraction of paternally 
inherited cffDNA in maternal plasma or serum to determine fetal 
characteristics, such as gender. The invention, commercialized by 
Sequenom as its MaterniT21 test, created an alternative for prenatal 
diagnosis of fetal DNA that avoids the risks of widely-used techniques 
that took samples from the fetus or placenta. In 2001, Drs. Lo and 
Wainscoat obtained the ‘540 patent, which relates to this discovery.41
¶11 The Federal Circuit held the patent invalid, as preempting a natural phenomenon: 
34 788 F.3d 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2015). 
35 134 S. Ct. 2347 (2014). 
36 See McJohn, Top Tens in 2014, supra note 29, at 321–23 (discussing Alice).
37 Id. at 323 (quoting Alice).
38 Internet Patents Corp. v. Active Network, Inc., 790 F.3d 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2015). 
39 Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Capital One Bank (USA), 792 F.3d 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2015). 
40 See generally JAMES BESSEN & MICHAEL J. MEURER, PATENT FAILURE: HOW JUDGES,
BUREAUCRATS, AND LAWYERS PUT INNOVATORS AT RISK (2008). 
41 Ariosa Diagnostics, Inc. v. Sequenom, Inc., 788 F.3d 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2015). 
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The concern is that “patent law not inhibit further discovery by improperly 
tying up the future use of these building blocks of human ingenuity.” In 
other words, patent claims should not prevent the use of the basic building 
blocks of technology—abstract ideas, naturally occurring phenomena, and 
natural laws.42
¶12 If such patents are not valid, they will not be effective to prevent competitors or to 
secure licensing revenue. 
G. Williamson v. Citrix Online, LLC43
¶13  Citrix represents another limitation on software patents, and so a challenge to 
software licensors, especially those that seek to enforce broad claims. Software patents 
are often drafted in broad terms. After Alice, such claims may be challenged as abstract 
ideas. In addition, even more specific software claims may be narrowed or invalidated as 
being “means-plus-function” claims. The scope of such a patent may be considerably 
narrowed (or invalidated for vagueness) if the claim is held to be a means-plus-function 
claim, meaning that the written description of the claimed invention must contain a 
specific description of the general “means” in claim.44
¶14 A long-standing issue is, which claims are deemed to be means-plus-function 
claims. In Citrix, the Federal Circuit, ruling en banc, abandoned its prior practice that if a 
claim did not actually use “means” there was a “strong presumption” that the claim was 
not a means-plus-function claim.45  Applying that reasoning, the court held that “module” 
could refer to a means, where that interpretation made sense in light of the entire patent. 
Other cases in 2015 were consistent. The term “compliance mechanism” in a patent claim 
was held to claim a means for compliance, meaning the patent was invalid for failing to 
describe a structure that would provide that means.46 A patent asserted against 
smartphone sellers was invalid for indefiniteness, where the specification did not disclose 
algorithms or other structure to support the means claimed.47 Because computer 
inventions in particular often involve functional claiming issues, means-plus function 
determinations can determine the outcome of such litigation. 48
42 Id. at 1379 (relying on Alice).
43 792 F.3d 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (en banc). 
44 See Mark A. Lemley, Software Patents and the Return of Functional Claiming, 2013 WIS. L. REV.
905 (2013). 
45 Williamson v. Citrix Online, LLC, 792 F.3d 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2015). 
46 Media Rights Techs., Inc. v. Capital One Fin. Corp., 800 F.3d 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2015). 
47 EON Corp. IP Holdings LLC v. AT&T Mobility LLC, 2015 U.S. App. LEXIS 7464 (Fed. Cir. May 
6, 2015). 
48 See Lemley, supra note 46. 
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H. In re Orbital Techs. Corp.49
Circuit Check, Inc. v. QXQ Inc.50
¶15  Orbital and Circuit Check simply represent the continuing challenge to patent law, 
in the age of information and globalization, of appropriately identifying technology 
which might precede an invention and so render it unpatentable.  In Orbital, patent law 
recognized the efficiencies afforded by software, while accepting the accompanying 
limitations.  A computerized translation of a patent, with considerable errors in grammar 
and punctuation, was sufficient to serve as disabling prior art disclosure: “Without 
blessing the use of machine translations in all cases, we find that the Machine Translation 
used here provided adequate evidence of Tomofuji's contents because of the simplicity of 
the technology and the teachings of Tomofuji's figures. It was therefore sufficient to 
support the examiner's obviousness case.”51 But, in Circuit Check, rock carvings were an 
insufficient basis to hold a circuit board testing device to be obvious.52 Although the 
technology used in marking areas to be carved in rock carving may be similar, one 
working on circuit board testing devices would not necessarily consult rock carving 
techniques in addressing a problem of marking plates in manufacturing. 
I. In re Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC53
¶16 The issue of patent validity is key to the dynamics of patent licensing. If a patent 
holder seeks licensing royalties, the other party may refuse on the grounds that the patent 
is invalid. Whether to refuse depends, in part, on how costly and time-consuming it may 
be to contest the validity of the patent. The America Invents Act in 2011 introduced post-
grant procedures, new ways to challenge patent validity. Previously, if a party believed a 
patent was invalid, the only ways to challenge it might be to raise invalidity as a defense 
to an infringement suit or to bring a declaratory action. Either way required all the 
expenses and delay of patent litigation in federal court. Post-grant procedures offer a 
much simpler route, challenging the validity of the patent in a narrowly defined 
procedure in the US Patent and Trademark Office, which by statute should take no more 
than eighteen months. In Cuozzo, the Federal Circuit upheld key aspects of the post-grant 
procedures, against challenges that the administrative procedure improperly failed to 
mirror patent litigation in court: that a decision by the USPTO to grant a request to 
institute a post-grant proceeding is not appealable; that the Patent Trials and Appeals 
Board may apply the broadest reasonable interpretation of a claim, as opposed to the 
narrower standard for claim interpretation applied by courts in litigation; and that 
amendment of claims may be limited during PTAB proceedings. Hundreds of patent 
challenges are making their way through the PTAB. Cuozzo signals the availability of 
this new method for parties to challenge patent validity (and thereby avoid the need for a 
patent license or, where no license is available, to cease their activity). 
49 2015 U.S. App. LEXIS 970, *19 (Fed. Cir. Jan. 20, 2015). 
50 795 F.3d 1331 (Fed. Cir. 2015). 
51 In re Orbital Techs. Corp., 2015 U.S. App. LEXIS 970, *19 (Fed. Cir. Jan. 20, 2015). 
52 Circuit Check, Inc. v. QXQ Inc., 795 F.3d 1331 (Fed. Cir. 2015). 
53 793 F.3d 1268 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
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J. VDF FutureCeuticals, Inc. v. Stiefel Labs., Inc.54
¶17  VDF FutureCeuticals illustrates how difficult it may be to draft a license that will 
keep the other party to the perceived terms of the bargain. A licensor licensed the right to 
make and sell “CoffeeBerry-based skin-care products,” in exchange for a percentage of 
sales and of revenue from sublicensees. The license prohibited assignment, but did not 
address changes of control. A sublicensee purchased all the stock of the licensee. This 
gave the sublicensee control of the sublicensor (the licensee in the original license), 
resulting in fewer royalties payable on the license. Because the parties achieved this by a 
means permitted in the license (a change of control), it did not breach the license, 
including royalty obligations.55
K. Lelo Inc. v. ITC56
ClearCorrect Operating, LLC v. ITC57
Westerngeco L.L.C. v. Ion Geophysical Corp.58
¶18 The International Trade Commission enforcement procedures can be used to bar 
importation of infringing products, offering an alternative to patent litigation. But 
jurisdiction requires a showing of an effect on investment in the United States. Lelo held
that whether there is ITC jurisdiction to bar allegedly patent-infringing importation 
depends on quantitative factors, such as a significant investment in plant or equipment in 
the United States, not qualitative factors such as “crucial” component purchases from the 
United States.59 ClearCorrect decided a question with broad implications: whether ITC 
proceedings could be used to get injunctions against transmissions of data that could 
facilitate patent infringement. The Federal Circuit held that jurisdiction to bar imports of 
infringing “articles” does not apply to transmission of data, and so the ITC cannot be 
used to police patent infringement by electronic transmission.60 Returning to patent 
litigation in federal court, Westerngeco addressed another question with international 
implications. The court held that a patent holder may recover for infringement by actions 
in part outside the United States (such as where a supplier exported components intended 
to be combined in an infringing manner) but the remedy is limited to reasonable royalties, 
not a portion of the profits.61
L. Speedtrack, Inc. v. Office Depot, Inc. 
¶19 Another case, not limited by a statutory reference to “articles,” reflects how 
doctrine can adopt to trade in information. The Kessler doctrine bars an action against the 
54 792 F.3d 842 (7th Cir. 2015). 
55 VDF FutureCeuticals, Inc. v. Stiefel Labs., Inc., 792 F.3d 842 (7th Cir.  2015). 
56 Lelo Inc. v. ITC, 2015 U.S. App. LEXIS 7708 (Fed. Cir. May 11, 2015). 
57 2015 U.S. App. LEXIS 19558 (Fed. Cir. Nov. 10, 2015). 
58 Westerngeco L.L.C. v. Ion Geophysical Corp., 791 F.3d 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2015). 
59 Lelo Inc. v. ITC, 2015 U.S. App. LEXIS 7708 (Fed. Cir. May 11, 2015). 
60 ClearCorrect Operating, LLC v. ITC, 2015 U.S. App. LEXIS 19558 (Fed. Cir. Nov. 10, 2015). 
61 Westerngeco L.L.C. v. Ion Geophysical Corp., 791 F.3d 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2015). 
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customers of a supplier of a product, where the supplier has been found not to infringe 
the patent.62 Speedtrack applied the doctrine in the context of software services, even in 
the absence of a tangible product.63
II. TRADEMARK
A. Sprinkler Warehouse, Inc. v. Systematic Rain, Inc.64
¶20 Domain names have figured prominently in trademark law developments, from 
leading cases to a federal statute aimed squarely at bad faith registration of domain 
names, the ACPA. But their legal nature remains to be fitted into existing categories. 
There has been considerable theoretical speculation on whether a domain name might be 
property, services provided under a contract, or a new hybrid legal concept. But there is 
little concrete case law on the issue, what is a domain name, as a legal entity. Sprinkler
Warehouse held, following sparse authority, that a domain name is personal property, 
subject to garnishment for the benefit of creditors.65
B. Apple v. Samsung Elecs. Co.66
¶21 A product’s design cannot be protected as a trademark if the design is functional. 
The Supreme Court established as much in Traffix, holding that after the patent expired 
on a popular design of temporary road signs, the ex-patentee Traffix could not prevent 
others from using the design on the theory that the sign’s design was the trademark of 
Traffix.67 The functionality doctrine has importance in an age where product 
configuration has ever-greater market power. Apple v. Samsung held the product 
configuration of the iPhone to be functional, and so not protected as trade dress, meaning 
competitors that copied would not be liable for trademark infringement. Note that the 
decision does not mean that product design cannot be protected as intellectual property. 
Foresighted manufacturers can still use design patents to protect design, as Apple in fact 
did.
C. Pro-Football, Inc. v. Blackhorse68
In re Tam69
¶22 Intellectual property licensing is a key commercial activity that can have expressive 
aspects, for the trademark owner and others. Several cases addressed the interplay 
between the expressive effect of a mark, its effect on others, and whether the expression 
62 Kessler v. Eldred, 206 U.S. 285 (1907). 
63 791 F.3d 1317 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (applying Kessler doctrine). 
64 859 N.W.2d 527 (Minn. Ct. App. 2015) (“[W]e hold here that a domain name is a form of property 
and we conclude that, despite the fact that a domain name may be categorized both as property and as a 
contract for services, a domain name nevertheless qualifies as property subject to garnishment”). 
65 Id. at 532. 
66 2015 U.S. App. LEXIS 8096 (Fed. Cir. May 18, 2015). 
67 Traffix Devices v. Mktg. Displays, 532 U.S. 23 (U.S. 2001). 
68 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 89932 (E.D. Va. July 8, 2015). 
69 785 F.3d 567 (Fed. Cir. 2015). 
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was protected by trademark law and the First Amendment. A federal district court held 
that the “Washington Redskins” trademark for a professional football team was properly 
cancelled by the US Patent & Trademark Office, on the grounds that the mark was 
disparaging to Native Americans.70 The court rejected the First Amendment argument, 
reasoning that registration of the mark was government speech, which the government 
itself may govern. The court further reasoned that the party could still use the mark and 
still protect it under common law rights. By contrast, In re Tam held that the First 
Amendment barred enforcing the rule against registering disparaging marks, holding that 
the USPTO could not refuse to register “The Slants” for an Asian-American dance rock 
band.71
D. Virag, S.R.L. v. Sony Comput. Etm’t Am. LLC72
Screenshot from game in Virag73
¶23 Another conflict between trademark law and free expression may arise where an 
author uses another person’s trademark in a creative work.  For example, songs and song 
titles often reference trademarks.  Books—both fiction and non-fiction—mention 
trademarks.  It would be hard to write about marketing or culture without mentioning 
trademarks.  Recently, uses of marks in creative works, such as video games, have been 
held not to infringe.  The balance has weighed heavily in favor of free expression against 
the slight risk of confusion as to sponsorship. 
70 Pro-Football, Inc. v. Blackhorse, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 89932 (E.D. Va. July 8, 2015) 
71 785 F.3d 567 (Fed. Cir. 2015). 
72 No. 3:15-CV-01729-LB, 2015 WL 5000102, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 21, 2015). 
73 Jordan Greer, Sony Faces Down Gran Turismo Trademark Lawsuit in California Courts, GTPLANET
(Aug. 31, 2015), https://www.gtplanet.net/sony-faces-down-a-gran-turismo-trademark-lawsuit-in-
california-courts/ [https://perma.cc/X9YQ-46N4]. 
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E. Multi Time Mach., Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc.74
 Screenshot (post-case) of Amazon results for search of “MTM Special Ops”75
¶24 The “initial interest confusion” doctrine has been thought to prevent people from 
free-riding on others’ trademarks by deceptively gaining consumers’ attention with use of 
a mark, even where any confusion or deception was dispelled before the sale. The classic 
example is putting Rolex prominently on the storefront of a store that sells no Rolexes.  
Once inside, the potential buyers may be diverted to other brands that are available.  
Initially, the initial interest doctrine was thought suitable for the Internet, with its constant 
battle for eyeballs.  But subsequent cases cast doubt on this theory. Most recently, the 
Ninth Circuit held there was no trademark infringement where a search on Amazon for a 
brand of watches (“MTM Special Ops”), which Amazon does not sell, returned results 
featuring the products of competing watch sellers.76 The court rejected the application of 
initial interest confusion.77
F. Radiance Found., Inc. v. NAACP78
¶25 Yet another angle on free expression is whether it protects the use of a trademark to 
criticize the very holder of the mark.  In Radiance Foundation, the Fourth Circuit held 
74 804 F.3d 930 (9th Cir. 2015). 
75 “MTM Special Ops,” AMAZON, http://www.amazon.com/s/ref=nb_sb_noss_2?url=search-
alias%3Daps&field-keywords=MTM+Special+Ops [https://perma.cc/9KWQ-HWCZ] (last visited Feb. 1, 
2016).
76 MultiTime Mach., Inc., 804 F.3d at 933.
77 Id. at 937–38. 
78 786 F.3d 316 (4th Cir. 2015). 
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there was no infringement in using the mark “NAACP” in an online article criticizing the 
NAACP.79  Use in social criticism and commentary is not use in connection with the sale 
of goods or services, as required for trademark infringement, the court held, even if the 
site solicited donations.80  A web search for “NAACP” might lead to the page, but that 
was not the consumer confusion that the Lanham Act guards against.81  Nor was there 
“tarnishment,” a form of trademark dilution.82  The Lanham Act limits the dilution cause 
of action with the defense of using the mark in “identifying and parodying, criticizing, or 
commenting upon the famous mark owner or the goods or services of the famous mark 
owner.”83  In short, a trademark owner cannot limit criticism of it by preventing others 
from directly referring to it.  Similarly, use of a trademark in keyword advertising has 
been held not to infringe, where there was a strong inference “that the purpose of 
Defendants’ use of the marks [was] to disparage Plaintiff and endorse [Defendant],” 
which would reduce any likelihood of confusion. 84
G. Nola Spice Designs, L.L.C. v. Haydel Enters.85
From Appendix to Nola Spice opinion 
79 Id. at 320–21. 
80 Id. at 326–27. 
81 See id. at 325. The Fourth Circuit’s discussion is reminiscent of the Ninth Circuit’s refusal to apply 
the initial interest confusion doctrine in Amazon. See MultiTime Mach., Inc., 804 F.3d at 937–38. 
82 Radiance Found, Inc., 786 F.3d at 319. 
83 Id. at 330 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(3)(A)(ii) (2015)).
84 Goldline, LLC v. Regal Assets, LLC, No. 14-03680, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 52417, at *7 (C.D. Cal. 
Apr. 21, 2015). 
85 783 F.3d 527 (5th Cir. 2015). 
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¶26 Generic terms cannot serve as protectable as trademarks because they are merely 
descriptive terms and are not distinctive. They do not distinguish a seller of the goods or 
services from other sellers. Nola Spice shows how that doctrine can apply not just to 
words but also to designs.86  In Nola Spice, the Fifth Circuit held that a stylized dog 
figure made from traditional Mardi Gras beads was not a protectable trademark for its 
seller because the symbol was merely descriptive of the Mardi Gras-themed products 
(like the words "Mardi Gras Bead Dog," which the seller had no trademark rights in).87
H. In re Newbridge Cutlery Co.88
¶27  Newbridge Cutlery Co. highlights the growing importance of international 
trademark protection.  A primarily geographically descriptive mark, such as the name of 
a town, is generally not registrable with the PTO because it is merely descriptive of the 
goods and not distinctive.89 The PTO will register a primarily geographically descriptive 
mark if it acquires distinctiveness (i.e., where consumers know the mark so well that it 
has become associated with that particular seller).90  However, only geographic terms that 
are primarily descriptive are unregistrable under the Lanham Act.91 “The rationale for 
allowing registration of marks that relevant consumers do not view as primarily 
geographic is that the consume would consider such marks ‘arbitrary.’”92 Whether a mark 
is primarily geographically descriptive depends, in part, on how well known the name of 
the place is to the public in the U.S., not its country of origin.93 Therefore, the Federal 
Circuit held that the name of an obscure town, Newbridge, Ireland, was not the name of 
“a place known generally to the relevant American public”—and thus, not 
unregistrable—even if the place was well known abroad.94
I. B&B Hardware, Inc. v. Hargis Indus.95
¶28 In B&B Hardware, the Supreme Court addressed a procedural issue with 
considerable practical impact: whether the normal rules of issue preclusion in federal 
court litigation apply to a finding of likelihood of confusion by the Trademark Trial and 
Appeal Board (“TTAB”).96  The TTAB can determine whether two marks are 
confusingly similar—and therefore, whether registration of one should be denied or 
86 Id. at 542–43. 
87 Id. at 538, 542–43.
88 776 F.3d 854 (Fed. Cir. 2015). 
89 Id. at 859–60. 
90 Id. at 859. 
91 Id. at 860 (quoting Nantucket, 677 F.2d at 99 (“The word ‘primarily’ should not be overlooked, for it 
is not the intent of the federal statute to refuse registration of a mark where the geographical meaning is 
minor, obscure, remote, or unconnected with the goods.”)).  
92 Id. (citing Nantucket, 677 F.2d at 100 n.8). 
93 Id. at 862 (“That Newbridge is the second largest town in County Kildare and the seventeenth largest 
in the Republic of Ireland reveals nothing about what the relevant American purchaser might perceive the 
word “Newbridge” to mean and is too insignificant to show that Newbridge is a place known generally to 
the American purchasing public.”). 
94 Id.
95 135 S. Ct. at 1293 (2015). 
96 Id. at 1299. 
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cancelled—and it does so by applying the same thirteen DuPont factors that federal 
courts apply.97  The TTAB is an administrative agency, and those procedures and burdens 
before the TTAB are somewhat different than in federal courts.  Before B&B Hardware,
it was unsettled whether the party that won before the TTAB could then use that finding 
of likelihood of confusion to win a trademark infringement suit in federal court.  In B&B
Hardware, the Supreme Court “h[e]ld that a court should give preclusive effect to TTAB 
decisions if the ordinary elements of issue preclusion are met.”98 As with Cuozzo for 
patents, the case gives weight to administrative proceedings involving intellectual 
property, and so their importance in licensing practice. 
J. Hana Fin., Inc. v. Hana Bank99
¶29 In Hana Fin., the Supreme Court held that the question of whether “tacking” is 
available in determining trademark rights is a question for the jury to decide, not the 
judge, “[b]ecause the tacking inquiry operates from the perspective of an ordinary 
purchaser or consumer . . . .”100  A trademark owner may change or modify his mark over 
time without losing the mark’s priority date, provided that the two versions of the mark, 
“create the same, continuing commercial impression,” rendering them “legal 
equivalents,” such that the modified mark is entitled to the priority date of the original 
mark.101 Hana Fin. makes this issue a question of fact to be decided by the jury.102  Just 
as the Teva decision put factual questions required for patent claim interpretation within 
the province of the jury, so Hana Fin. may give juries a greater role in trademark cases. 
K. Sandshaker Lounge & Package Store LLC v. Quietwater Entm’t Inc.103
¶30  Sandshaker Lounge highlights a key distinction between licensing of trademarks 
and licensing of copyrights and patents.  There are many steps a trademark owner must 
take to ensure its mark remains protectable and enforceable.  For example, the mark 
owner must take all necessary steps to ensure its mark remains distinctive.  Additionally, 
some enforcement may be necessary to avoid abandonment.  Enforcement was the issue 
in Sandshaker Lounge. In Sandshaker Lounge, a bar claimed trademark rights in the 
BUSHWACKER mark as applied to musical performances.104  However, the Eleventh 
Circuit held that “whatever rights Quietwater might have had, its slumber on them rivaled 
Rip van Winkel’s” because it waited nearly two decades until it finally objected to the 
defendant’s use of the BUSHWACKER mark.105
97 Id. at 1301. 
98 Id. at 1299. 
99 135 S. Ct. 907 (2015). 
100 Id. at 909. 
101 Id.
102 Id.
103 602 F. App’x 784 (11th Cir. 2015). 
104 Id. at 788.
105 Id.
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III. COPYRIGHT
A. Garcia v. Google, Inc.106
A screenshot from the film at issue in Garcia
¶31 In 2014, a divided panel on the Ninth Circuit potentially upended copyright 
licensing practice by reversing the district court’s denial of a preliminary injunction and 
holding that an actor, Garcia, “was likely to prevail on her copyright claim as to her 
[brief] individual performance” in a film.107  Under that approach, even if the actor had 
agreed that she had no authorship interest in the film’s copyright, her separate 
performance copyright would have to be accounted for in licensing the film.  Taken 
broadly, anyone who added any creative expression to a work could have his or her own 
separate copyright—the editor’s copyright in a paragraph of a novel or the lighting 
director’s copyright in the display of a particular scene of a play.  Those copyrights 
would have effectively prevailed over agreements that the editor or lighting director 
claimed no copyright in the novel or play.   The Ninth Circuit sitting en banc, however, 
overturned its prior holding Garcia on the grounds that an actor’s performance is not a 
separate copyrightable work.108  Rather, a party that did not qualify as a joint author 
could not circumvent that rule (or an agreement they had signed) by multiplying 
106 786 F.3d 733 (9th Cir. 2015) (en banc). 
107 Garcia v. Google, Inc. 743 F.3d 1258, amended by Garcia v. Google, Inc., 766 F.3d 929, 935 (9th 
Cir. 2014).
108 Garcia, 786 F.3d at 740–41. 
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copyrights.109  Not everything will qualify as a separate work of authorship.  An actor’s 
performance is not a copyrightable “work” of authorship.110
B. PhantomALERT, Inc. v. Google Inc.111
Screenshot taken of PhantomALERT’s site112
¶32 The first copyright statute of the United States covered only books, maps and 
charts. The extent of copyright protection for maps has been litigated, albeit sporadically, 
ever since. The case of maps is a classic teaching example for copyright classes. Facts are 
not subject to copyright protection, because they do not originate with the author, even if 
she discovers them.113 However, facts may be selected or arranged in a creative fashion to 
warrant copyright protection.114 So a map, although it depicts facts, may have sufficient 
creativity to be copyrighted. 
¶33  PhantomALERT reinforces the freedom to copy facts that others make available, 
unless someone has agreed to a license restricting copying.  In PhantomALERT, the
Northern District of California dismissed PhantomALERT’s complaint alleging that 
Google infringed its copyright by copying “Points of Interest” (such as police speed-
check radar locations) from PhantomALERT’s database of navigation information.115  In 
PhantomALERT, the court stated that “[i]t [was] apparent from the allegation in the 
Complaint that Plaintiff’s Points of Interest are inherently factual, involving ‘traffic 
109 Id. at 742. 
110 See id.  The Second Circuit similarly held that the director of a film, who signed away his rights to 
the film copyright, did not have a separate copyright in his contribution to the film or to the raw footage 
that was not used in the film.  See 16 Casa Duse, LLC v. Merkin, 791 F.3d 247, 257–58 (2d Cir. 2015). 
111 No. 15-03986, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 167754 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 14, 2015). 
112 PHANTOMALERT, http://www.phantomalert.com/ [https://perma.cc/GM4N-ZH4G] (last visited 
Apr. 18, 2016). 
113 See Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 347–48 (1991). 
114 See id. at 348. 
115 PhantomALERT, Inc., 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 167754, at *2, 39.
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conditions, speed restrictions, and police-monitors,’ that is, objective facts that can be 
discovered and reported.”116
C. Tomayo-Tomahhdo, LLC v. Vozary117
I.C. ex rel. Solovsky v. Delta Galil USA118
Bikram’s Yoga Coll. of India, L.P. v. Evolation Yoga, LLC119
¶34 The Supreme Court has set a low bar for copyright protection, requiring only a 
minimal spark of creativity.120  However, that minimal spark of creativity must be met.  
For example, another old chestnut of copyright law is whether a recipe may be protected 
by copyright.  In Tomaydo-Tomahhdo, the Sixth Circuit held a recipe book insufficiently 
creative to be protected by copyright.121
¶35 However, even an elementary schoolchild’s fingerpainting may be subject to 
copyright protection, which illustrates just how low the bar for copyright protection is.122  
In Solovsky, the court held that a second grader’s T-Shirt design (with the word “hi” on 
the front with a smiley face and the word “bye” on the back with a frowny face) 
sufficiently creative to survive the defendant’s motion to dismiss.123 Therefore, it was 
potentially infringement for a company that sponsored the contest to use a similar design 
without the child’s permission.124  In the age of Big Data, whether information is 
protected by copyright may greatly influence licensing practices. 
116 PhantomALERT, Inc., 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 167754, at *26. 
117 No. 15-3179, 2015 U.S. App. LEXIS 18384 (6th Cir. Oct. 20, 2015). 
118 No. 14-7289, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 132052 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 29, 2015). 
119 803 F.3d 1032 (9th Cir. 2015). 
120 See Feist, 499 U.S. at 361. 
121 Tomaydo-Tomahhdo, 2015 U.S. App. LEXIS 18384, at *1; see generally Cathay Y. N. Smith, Food
Art: Protecting “Food Presentation” Under U.S. Intellectual Property Law, 14 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL.
PROP. L. 1 (2014). 
122 See Solovsky, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 132052, at *29–34. 
123 Id.
124 Id.
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¶36 The Supreme Court long ago established that a photograph may be the subject of 
copyright protection.125 The Court has stated that there is ample creativity in the 
arrangement and selection of material in the frame.126  However, in Rigsby v. Erie Ins. 
Co., the Western District of Wisconsin dismissed plaintiffs’ copyright claim where 
plaintiffs did not “identify any conscious choices they made regarding lighting or camera 
angles for the purpose of being ‘original.’”127 Additionally, in Bikram's Yoga, the Ninth 
Circuit held that copyright did not extend to a sequence of twenty-six yoga poses and two 
breathing exercises, reasoning that the sequence was an unprotectable “idea, process, or 
system designed to improve health,” as opposed to a “compilation” or “choreographic 
work” like the choreography of a ballet.128
D. DC Comics v. Towle129
Batmobile130
¶37 Another classic question in copyright law is whether a character in a work can be 
subject to copyright protection. DC Comics put a new spin on that issue, when the Ninth 
Circuit held that a non-human character, a car known as the Batmobile, may be protected 
by copyright.131  In reaching that conclusion, the court used similar reasoning as that for 
human characters: (1) the character must generally have physical and conceptual 
qualities; (2) the character must be "sufficiently delineated" to be recognizable in 
repeated situations (i.e., the character must have “consistent, identifiable character traits 
and attributes, although the character need not have a consistent appearance); and (3) the 
character must be especially distinctive with unique elements, not just a stock 
character.132  Having said that, a stock car might not be a stock character; witness the 
leading characters in Pixar’s Cars.  The case is perhaps most notable in continuing the 
cheerful belief that legal formulations will provide predictable rules to categorize human 
creations.
125 See Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53, 58–59 (1884). 
126 See id.
127 No. 14-905, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 31711, at *8 (W.D. Wis. Mar. 16, 2015). 
128 Bikram's Yoga Coll. of India, L.P. v. Evolation Yoga, LLC, 803 F.3d 1032, 1036–37 (9th Cir. 
2015).
129 802 F.3d 1012 (9th Cir. 2015). 
130 Dominic Patten, “Holy Copyright Law, Batman!”: DC Comics Wins Batmobile Appeal, DEADLINE
HOLLYWOOD (Sept. 23, 2015, 9:14AM), http://deadline.com/2015/09/batmobile-dc-comics-batman-
copyright-lawsuit-warner-bros-1201545884/ [https://perma.cc/4GD3-BKWX]. 
131 DC Comics, 802 F.3d at 1021–22. 
132 Id. at 1021. 
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E. Ford Motor Co. v. Autel US. Inc.133
¶38 Software, whether data or programs, is an increasingly vital component of many 
products.  Manufacturers may use technical measures to restrict user access to that 
information.  They may in turn claim that those technical measures are protected as anti-
access measures. The Digital Millennium Copyright Act (“DMCA”) prohibits 
circumvention of technological measures that restrict access to copyrighted works.  Some 
courts, however, have read that prohibition narrowly.  For example, in Ford Motor, the 
Eastern District of Michigan held that Ford failed to plead its copyright infringement 
claim and dismissed Ford’s complaint, which alleged that Autel violated the DMCA by 
circumventing anti-access measures in order to access diagnostic data in the vehicles.134
The complaint alleged that Autel copied data but did not allege that Autel copied the 
aspects of the data base that would be protected by copyright—Ford’s selection, 
coordination, and arrangement of data.135  Autel circumvented anti-access measures, but 
not to infringe copyright, so there was no violation of the anti-circumvention rules.136
Ford Motor’s reading of the DMCA appears to narrow its scope because the anti-
circumvention provisions would be violated only where a party was likely infringing 
copyright anyway.137  But the contrary reading would give copyright-like protection well 
beyond that afforded by copyright law. 
¶39  When Congress passed the anti-circumvention rules, the statute provided a possible 
balance to their broad scope by authorizing the Librarian of Congress to issue exemptions 
to the anti-access rule, in order to protect such copyright values as fair use and the 
noncopyrightability of facts and ideas.  In practice, those exemptions have been very 
limited.  Perhaps cases like Ford Motor represent courts trying to step in to provide 
balance.
133 No. 14-13760, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 133201 (E.D. Mich. Sept. 30, 2015). 
134 Id. at 13–20.
135 Id. at 12. 
136 Id. at 13–20. 
137 See id. at 13–20. 
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F. Lenz v. Universal Music Corp.138
Authors Guild v. Google, Inc.139
City of Inglewood v. Teixeira140
“Let’s Go Crazy #1”141
¶40  Another notable aspect of the DMCA gives immunity to internet service providers 
for copyright infringement as long as they have a procedure in place to accommodate 
take-down claims from copyright owners. Universal Music sent such a take-down notice 
to YouTube when Lenz posted a video on the video-sharing site of her toddler dancing to 
Prince’s “Let’s Go Crazy” playing in the background.142  In Lenz, the Ninth Circuit held
that the DMCA “requires copyright holders to consider fair use before sending a 
takedown notification, and that failure to do so raises a triable issue as to whether the 
138 801 F.3d 1126 (9th Cir. 2015). 
139 804 F.3d 202 (2d Cir. 2015). 
140 No. 15-01815, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 143380 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 8, 2015). 
141 Stephanie Lenz, “Let’s Go Crazy” #1, YOUTUBE (Feb. 7, 2007), 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=N1KfJHFWlhQ [https://perma.cc/XXW9-R7E6]. 
142 See Lenz, 801 F.3d at 1129. 
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copyright holder formed a subjective good faith belief that the use was not authorized by 
law.”143  Many of the millions of take-down notices are generated by software.  The 
holding in Lenz means that copyright owners may need to adjust their software to avoid 
possible liability. 
¶41  Fair use can also affect such issues as whether a party may purchase a copyright in 
order to suppress the content for political reasons.144 In City of Inglewood v. Teixeira, fair 
use precluded the city from asserting its copyright interest in the video recordings of city 
council meetings and from recovering from a critic who posted portions, with subtitles 
and commentary.145
143 Id.
144 See generally Katz v. Google Inc., 802 F.3d 1178 (11th Cir. 2015). 
145 See City of Inglewood v. Teixeira, No. 15-01815, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 143380, at *2 (C.D. Cal. 
Oct. 8, 2015). 
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¶42  A blogger was protected by fair use in posting an “unflattering” photo of a business 
person, where the subject had purchased the copyright in order to assert rights to have the 
photo taken down.146
¶43  In Authors Guild v. Google, Inc., the Second Circuit held that fair use protected 
copying by the Google Book project, which involved scanning libraries of books, putting 
the files in a data base, and permitting online text searches that returned snippets of the 
books.147
G. Marya v. Warner/Chappell Music, Inc.148
A birthday scene from the film, “The Rejected”149
146 See generally Katz, 802 F.3d 1178. 
147 Authors Guild v. Google, Inc., 804 F.3d 202, 207 (2d Cir. 2015). 
148 No. 13-4460, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 129575 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 22, 2015). 
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¶44  “Happy Birthday to You” is a staple of copyright lore.  It illustrates how long 
copyright protection lasts because the song was still subject to a registered copyright in 
2015, despite being written in the 1920’s (and using music from before then).150  Further, 
enforcement of the copyright illustrates the scope of the owner’s public performance 
right.  It may be copyright infringement for the staff at a restaurant to sing “Happy 
Birthday to You” to a customer or for a scene in a movie to have a family sing the song at 
dinner over a cake.  To avoid licensing fees, restaurants may train their staff to sing other 
songs and screenwriters may avoid birthday song scenes.  The song now illustrates 
possible murkiness of copyright ownership.  For example, a court held that the 
Warner/Chappell Music, which had collected millions in royalties for more than eight 
decades for the “Happy Birthday to You” song, could not prove that it had copyright 
ownership interest in the work.151
IV. TRADE SECRET
A. Infogroup, Inc. v. DatabaseLLC152
¶45  Information licensing intersects with several branches of intellectual property law.  
Copyright does not protect a database, but a company can turn to trade secret law for 
protection.  But trade secret has its own requirements.  Parties may try and claim valuable 
information as a trade secret without having taken the steps necessary to secure trade 
secret protection.  In Infogroup, the court denied plaintiff’s motion for a preliminary 
injunction holding that the corporation was not likely to succeed on its trade secret claim 
because there was no evidence showing that its competitor had hacked or copied 
information from plaintiff’s database that was not from the public sources.153  Database 
owners may often license access to the information in the database.  That may create 
contractual obligations on the part of licensees, but does not, of itself, confer trade secret 
status on the information.  Trade secret law may not protect information in a database 
consisting primarily of information available to the public from the state.154  Therefore, 
the contractual protections may not give the information trade secret status, meaning that 
parties not bound by the contract are free to acquire and use the information.  A party 
cannot simply proclaim information to be proprietary and thereby make it illegal for 
others to use the information. 
149 Ramin Tork, Randeh Shodeh (The rejected) an Iranian movie, Iranian.com (Jan. 13, 2009), 
http://iranian.com/main/blog/ramintork/randeh-shodeh-rejected-iranian-movie.html 
[https://perma.cc/N35C-D6QR]; see also David Wall, Minions Sing Happy Birthday, YOUTUBE (May 9, 
2014), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xxOviBI-8fc [https://perma.cc/SSQ9-DZY6]. 
150 See, e.g., Marya, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 129575. 
151 Id. at *70–71. 
152 95 F. Supp. 3d 1170 (D. Neb. 2015). 
153 Id. at 1183. 
154 See id.
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B. Spear Mktg., Inc. v. BancorpSouth Bank155
¶46  To have trade secret protection, a party must keep the information secret.  In 
licensing, this may create tension between exploiting and marketing the information, 
which may require disclosing it, and securing trade secret protection, which requires 
secrecy.  In BancorpSouth Bank, the court found that there was insufficient evidence for 
the jury to find that a party “used” plaintiff’s trade secrets in coding software where that 
party had authorized access to view software demonstrations and later produced software 
with similar functions.156  In addition, to the extent a trade secret claim rested simply on 
unauthorized copying, the federal Copyright Act would preempt trade secret claims for 
copying an uncopyrighted idea underlying software. 
C. Big Vision Private, Ltd. v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co.157
Big Vision’s site158
¶47  License agreements require attention to such matters as who has rights under the 
agreement.  In trade secret, as with other types of intellectual property, a license can open 
the door to wider exploitation than a party might expect.  In Big Vision Private, the court 
granted summary judgment to defendant on plaintiff’s unfair competition claim where 
one division of the company shared information from a joint venture with another 
division of the company, but there was no breach of contract or trade secret 
misappropriation.159
155 95 F. Supp. 3d 1170 (D. Neb. 2015). 
156 Id. at *46–47. 
157 610 F. App’x 69 (2d Cir. 2015). 
158 BIGVISION, http://www.bigvision4u.com/Index.html [https://perma.cc/982A-C359] (last visited 
Apr. 22, 2016). 
159 Big Vision Private, 610 Fed. Appx. at 71–72. 
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D. Orthofix, Inc. v. Hunter160
¶48 Orthofix reinforces a basic point.  Licenses, like other contracts, may create legal 
protection of your information.  Disclosure of “confidential” information does not violate 
trade secret law if the information does not qualify as a trade secret (i.e., if there were not 
sufficient security measures or if the information is not valuable in a trade secret sense). 
But if the party has signed a non-disclosure agreement, the disclosure may constitute 
breach of contract.161
E. Warehouse Solutions, Inc. v. Integrated Logistics, LLC162
¶49  A common theme in trade secret case law is locking the barn door after the horse 
has been taken.  There is no legal protection for valuable information if the owner has not 
taken reasonable security measures to maintain secrecy.  In Warehouse Solutions, the 
court held that the features and functions of the software, which were discernible from 
output available to clients without security restrictions, did not constitute trade secrets, as 
opposed to the source code, which was not disclosed.163  In Warehouse Solutions, the
court acknowledged that the software distributed came from source code that was kept 
confidential and so remained a trade secret.164  Courts also sometimes blur the line 
between trade secret protection and misappropriation and are less likely to find that the 
defendant has acted wrongfully if the plaintiff hasn’t taken adequate security measures.165
160 No. 15-3216, 2015 U.S. App. LEXIS 20111 (6th Cir. Nov. 17, 2015). 
161 See, e.g., id. at *4. 
162 610 F. App’x 881 (11th Cir. 2015). 
163 Id. at 885. 
164 Id.
165 See, e.g., Events Media Network, Inc. v. Weather Channel Interactive, Inc., No. 13-03, 2015 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 12497, *26 (D.N.J. Feb. 3, 2015). 
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F. NanoMech, Inc. v. Suresh166
¶50  A difficult case is where an employee may have taken trade secrets to a competitor.  
The employer must identify the information, show that the legal requirements for trade 
secret protection are met, and show that the information has been misappropriated.  A 
proxy for protecting trade secrets is a noncompete agreement, where an employee simply 
promises not to work for competitors for a period of time.  Because such agreements limit 
a person’s very ability to work for a living, courts limit enforcement to reasonable terms 
(if they enforce them at all).  For example, a noncompete agreement with world-wide 
scope and application to an entire industry is too broad to enforce.167
G. Events Media Network, Inc. v. Weather Channel Interactive, Inc.168
¶51  Mere pretense of security will not give trade secret protection.  Where a party 
licensed information, a database of media events, under terms that promoted public 
availability, by encouraging disclosure of events to the public, the party could not 
demonstrate the necessary reasonable security measures for trade secret protection.169  A 
contract that imposes restrictions on disclosure, but also has provisions permitting 
disclosure, will not create trade secret protection.170 Events Media illustrates a common 
166 777 F.3d 1020, 1025 (8th Cir. 2015) (“NanoMech argues that an unlimited geographic scope is 
reasonable in this case because the company engages in global business and competes with nanotechnology 
companies around the world.  The Third Circuit in Victaulic Co. v. Tieman, 499 F.3d 227 (3rd Cir. 2007), 
observed that ‘[i]n this Information Age, a per se rule against broad geographic restrictions would seem 
hopelessly antiquated,’ id. at 237, and NanoMech advances a similar theme here.  But even assuming that 
the Arkansas court would accept a worldwide geographic scope as reasonable in this context, . . . Suresh's 
agreement is still overbroad because this agreement . . . prohibits her from working in any capacity for 
any business that competes with the company.  Under Arkansas law, a noncompete agreement must be 
valid as written; a court may not narrow it. Bendinger v. Marshalltown Trowell Co., 994 S.W.2d 468, 473 
(Ark. 1999). As we understand Arkansas law, a blanket prohibition on Suresh's ability to seek employment 
of any kind with an employer in the nanotechnology industry anywhere in the world is unreasonable and 
thus unenforceable.”). 
167 See id.
168 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12497. 
169 See id. at *26 (citations omitted) (“Finally, while the 2006 Agreement did contain a restriction on 
TWC's right to use the Information, or portions of it, in programs other than event or attraction listings, it is 
clear that this language also anticipates that such use could be permitted under the terms of the contract, 
and the following sentence even concedes that ‘[t]o the extent any such use has been made of the 
Information . . . [EMNI] consents to the continued use of such Information for such purpose.’  Such a 
provision hardly indicates that Plaintiff was concerned that the Event and Attraction Data, or any portion 
thereof, remain confidential indefinitely.”). 
170 See id.
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set of facts.  Only after a party realizes that it should have protected information against 
disclosure does it seek to use litigation to achieve that goal, but its initial failure to put 
reasonable security measures in place means that in litigation its trade secret claims will 
not succeed. 
H. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Gum Tree Prop. Mgmt.171
¶52 Nationwide highlights an important practical issue that impacts the decision on 
whether to license intellectual property.  Liability insurance coverage may not cover 
liability for intellectual property infringement.  In Nationwide, the court held that an 
insurance policy held for tort claims, such as advertising injuries, defamation and 
invasion of privacy claims, did not extend to trade secret claims.172  This may affect 
litigation strategy for both plaintiffs and defendants.  It also makes one think whether 
there is an overlooked market for offering intellectual property coverage insurance, 
because that would seem to be, in the rare but worst case, a potentially large risk that 
companies would be glad to pay a predictable premium to avoid.  On the other hand, such 
coverage may be difficult for insurance companies to quantify, given the very broad 
spectrum of possible claims, and the fact that the insured would have considerable control 
over whether its conduct was alleged to infringe. 
171 597 F. App’x 241 (5th Cir. 2015). 
172 Id. at 248.
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